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Abstract 
Whether New Public Management (NPM) ideas and practices have remained resilient or are 
now in decline remains a topic of contention. We investigate the case of a national system, 
introduced in 2006, for performance managing medical research in the United Kingdom’s 
National Health System (NHS). We argue that the system conforms to traditional NPM, 
providing empirical evidence of its late adoption and resilience. We highlight potential 
conflicts in the adoption of NPM in this context and demonstrate for the first time the 
potential for this NPM-style system to produce unintended and unwanted consequences in the 
context of medical research.  
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Introduction 
 
Debate continues in the field of public management scholarship as to whether there has been 
a paradigm change indicating the end of dominance by the model of New Public 
Management (NPM). While major NPM reforms were strongly evident in UK public services 
(for example in the introduction of general management, corporate Boards and a quasi-
market in the NHS) in the 1980s and 1990s, they have also been criticised for dysfunctional 
effects, including: excessive inter-agency fragmentation and silo based working (Dunleavy et 
al, 2006), the disengagement of professionals and a growing democratic deficit (Newman, 
2001) together with excessive performance management and top down control (Bevan and 
Hood, 2006) which then result in organizational gaming and short termism. Whether or not 
such NPM ‘reforms’ have endured in practice is both an open and a major question. 
Recent attempts to move beyond NPM approaches to public management reforming in the 
UK are evident, perhaps informed by these criticisms. At a meta level, the academic 
development (Newman, 2001; Osborne, 2009; Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2007) and (the partial) 
appropriation in the policy domain of the so called “Network Governance” (NG) reform 
narrative as an antidote to earlier NPM reforms was evident in the New Labour period (1997-
2010). Guiding NG ideas stress a range of softer values and associated policy mechanisms, 
including: collaboration, networks and partnership; the greater involvement of civil society 
and the third sector; staff reengagement after a period of managerialist excesses and 
democratic revitalisation. In practice, NG reforms were often mixed with enduring NPM 
elements, such as performance management. 
More specifically, the English health care sector was characterised by some important NG 
reforms in the 2000s. There was greater use of partnerships, whole systems working and 
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managed networks to deliver major service improvement objectives. For example, the 2000 
NHS Cancer Plan led to the creation of sub-regional managed cancer networks (Ferlie, 2013) 
as a ‘delivery vehicle’. A new patient safety and quality agenda emerged which led to an 
increased interest in techniques which could help promote goals of service improvement, 
such as quality management models. There was a broadening of perspective beyond the old 
NPM themes of sharper operational management, efficiency savings and ramping up 
productivity. 
There was also an attempt to develop and engage clinical leadership going beyond reliance 
on the narrow general managerial cadre favoured by earlier NPM reforms (Griffiths, 1983). 
There was now increased stress on working with civil society and the promotion of more 
effective user involvement, notably so in the mental health sector. Many of these wider 
themes were strongly expressed in the health policy domain in the Darzi Report (Department 
of Health, 2008), published towards the end of the New Labour period. Themes of 
organizational learning, staff and user engagement were stressed again in the Berwick Report 
(2013) as it tried to unpick lessons from major failures at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust. 
 Given these developments, some argue the problems of NPM are now being addressed 
through post-NPM reform, that NPM is ‘dead in the water’ (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & 
Tinkler, 2006, p. 468) and that other models are rising (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014; 
Dunleavy et al., 2006; Osborne, 2009). Others, however, have suggested that NPM remains 
embedded and resilient in the United Kingdom (UK) and other high NPM jurisdictions, 
despite operating dysfunctionally (De Vries & Nemec, 2013; Ferlie & Fitzgerald, 2002; 
Ferlie et al, 2011; Ferlie & Ongaro, 2015; Lodge & Gill, 2011; Trenholm & Ferlie, 2013). 
This debate about resilience or decline of the NPM model is therefore of particular 
importance since the NPM model has been the subject of criticism given evidence of 
dysfunctional effects. 
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In this paper we explore a national system for performance managing medical research in the 
UK’s NHS which was introduced as part of the National Institute for Health Research 
(NIHR), founded in 2006. We explore the following research question: Do staff experiences 
and perceptions indicate the potential for unintended or unwanted consequences due to the 
NIHR Local Clinical Research Network (LCRN) performance management system? We 
discuss whether this system for allocating infrastructural funds to medical research in the 
NHS constitutes an example of NPM resilience or decline. 
Empirically, this paper contributes data on the work practices and systems of the NIHR, an 
important but relatively recently created agency, and one that has received scant scholarly 
attention. Theoretically, it contributes to the debate on whether NPM is in decline or remains 
resilient. We provide evidence of continued resilience of the NPM model in the English 
health sector (specifically, in the area of health research), a surprising finding perhaps given 
the model’s liability for dysfunctional features. We argue that the NIHR’s performance 
management system conforms to traditional NPM principles, providing recent evidence of the 
late-adoption of NPM in an additional sector and the resilience of this paradigm in the UK. 
Through a case study of a high-performing NHS Trust we demonstrate the potential for this 
NPM-based performance management system to produce unintended and unwanted 
consequences. The paper highlights the need for further public management research on 
NIHR organisational practices and contributes new knowledge to the debate surrounding the 
resilience or decline of NPM.  
 
The New Public Management 
 
Since the 1980’s the public sector in the UK, as in some other OECD countries, has been 
subject to a linked set of politically and ideologically motivated reforms often referred to as 
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the ‘New Public Management’ (Hood, 1991) and the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) 
has been held up as an index case for NPM reforms (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & 
Pettigrew, 1996). NPM doctrine claims to seek economy, efficiency, effectiveness in its 
redesign of public services, and to restore governability by taking power back from allegedly 
over-mighty public sector trade unions and professionals. It is characterised by top-down 
control, greater emphasis on output controls, disaggregation of the public sector into 
corporatized units, a shift to greater competition, greater flexibility in hiring staff and stress 
on cutting direct costs (Hood, 1991).  
More recently it has been suggested that under NPM, performance management has become 
the core of public management control strategies (Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 
2015). Indeed, such is the current focus on performance that NPM has been referred to as a 
‘performance movement’ (Van Dooren et al., 2015, p. 48) and authors refer to the rise of 
‘government by performance management’ (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005) ‘the new evaluation 
state’ (Henkel, 1991), the ‘regulatory state’ (Day & Klein, 1990) and an ‘audit society’ 
(Power, 1997).  
There exists a large body of literature investigating the effects of New Public Management. 
Many authors contest the success of NPM (Hood, 2006; Kelman & Friedman, 2009; 
Loveday, 2008; McCann et al, 2015; Pollitt & Dan, 2011; Simonet, 2014; Smith, 1993; 
Verbeeten & Speklé, 2015) and the literature further documents numerous unintended 
consequences (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Hood & Peters, 2004; Lester et al, 2011; Mannion & 
Braithwaite, 2012; Smith, 1995; Wankhade, 2011).  
In part, disagreement centres on differing definitions of success. While the value system 
underlying NPM reform emphasises criteria such as value for money, productivity and the 
efficacy of competition (Hood, 1991), the literature evidencing its unintended consequences 
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tends to define success more broadly. Measurement systems are rarely unobtrusive and risk 
influencing behaviour and there is concern that NPM models may encourage organisations to 
“[hit] the target and miss the point” (Bevan & Hood, 2006, p. 521). Smith (1995), for 
example, has grouped unintended consequences into categories, including, for example, ‘sub-
optimisation’ and ‘measure fixation’. In the former, workers focus narrowly on measured 
local objectives at the expense of the objectives of the organisation as a whole. In the latter, 
workers pursue strategies which enhance the reported measure rather than wider associated 
objectives. As measures provide a snapshot, they may encourage myopia. The literature 
refers to ‘gaming’, the deliberate manipulation of behaviour to secure strategic advantage 
(Smith, 1995).  
Highlighted empirical examples of such behaviour in the English NHS include, general 
practitioner practices responding to a target to see their patients within 48 hours by refusing 
to book any appointments more than 48 hours in advance (Bevan & Hood, 2006); patients 
being left to wait in ambulances outside the hospital until staff were confident of meeting a 
target for less than 4 hour wait in A&E (Commission for Health Improvement, 2004); 
treatments commencing but not being completed in situations in which the performance 
management indicator only measured commencement (Hood, 2006). In a landmark case in 
England, the inquiry into sub-standard care in the Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust found 
that “patients were routinely neglected by a trust that was preoccupied with cost cutting, 
targets and processes and which lost sight of its fundamental responsibility to provide safe 
care” (Francis, 2013). 
Critiques of NPM-style performance management highlight key obstacles to its success. For 
example, Lewis (2016) asserts that NPM-style management of health care has, paradoxically, 
led to simultaneously too much and too little performance measurement and management. 
The accusation of too much refers to the expansion of these practices across the sector, 
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creating a potentially bewildering array of performance frameworks. Meanwhile, a 
management deficit would seem evident from the high profile cases cited above, where 
services achieving high performance on indicators have subsequently been shown to be 
providing sub-standard care. Moreover, the tendency to select only those indicators for which 
data are available can bias measurement towards measurable dimensions, leading to concept 
reduction and deficits in understanding broader practice. Ultimately, performance data are 
often unavailable for the concept managers wish to measure (Van Dooren et al., 2015). 
Further, while the English health system has embraced the concept of learning for the 
purpose of enhanced patient safety and service improvement (Department of Health, 2000), 
NPM-style systems have been criticised for the barriers they present to learning (Senge et al, 
1994) due to concept reduction and the potential conflict between accountability (which may 
dis-incentivise highlighting weaknesses) and learning (which requires identifying 
weaknesses)  (Tan & Harvey, 2016; Van Dooren et al., 2015). 
Specifically in relation to the management of health research, Croxson and colleagues (2001) 
highlight that the standard approach to managing performance involves using uniform 
performance indicators that can be specified in advance and evaluated at well-defined 
intervals. However, this approach is extremely difficult to apply to R&D since research is 
rarely a linear process with end points predictable in advance. Indeed, it is not always 
possible or desirable to pre-specify appropriate research outcome based targets. Croxson and 
colleagues (2001) theorise that targets specified in advance may bias research effort towards 
less risky projects. Indeed, systematic control through performance management may inhibit 
the exploratory, creative behaviour required for successful research (Ouchi, 1977, p. 99). 
Further, research suffers an attribution problem: it is not always possible to attribute an 
outcome to a specific piece of R&D. Rather, outcomes are often the result of cumulative 
efforts and considerable time may pass before a project bears fruit, making it difficult to link 
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outcomes to annual investment. Given the variety of project types, standard performance 
indicators may not be suitable for all programmes and activities (Croxson, 2001). 
Discussing potential models of health research management in the NHS, Croxson and 
colleagues (2001, p. 228) argued that, given the limitations set out above, R&D performance 
management systems should not attempt to set uniform targets in advance. Instead the system 
should aim to meet an alternative set of five criteria: it should be relevant to funder’s 
objectives, be decision-relevant, encourage truthful compliance, minimise unintended 
consequences and have acceptable net costs. Measurement, should be multi-dimensional, 
incorporating both qualitative and quantitative feedback. While these proposed criteria are 
not sufficiently specific to set out a management regime they highlight a desire for a broader 
style than the quantitative, financial-accountability approach characteristic of NPM. Other 
authors have also called for systems to collect a mix of quantitative and qualitative data, and 
“soft intelligence” to tailor inspection towards local circumstances and assess aspects of 
performance that defy ready quantification (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Mannion & Braithwaite, 
2012). Indeed, research with senior healthcare leaders in the NHS has found widespread 
agreement concerning the limitations of formal metrics for monitoring quality and safety and 
the importance of incorporating ‘soft intelligence’ (Martin et al, 2015). Further, the key 
public inquiry in England into sub-standard hospital care, which was critical of over-reliance 
on quantitative indicators, recommended that to prevent future similar tragedies hospital 
needed to take greater heed of the insights of staff, patients and carers by paying greater 
attention to narratives (Francis, 2013). 
In summary, therefore, there is evidence that NPM does not necessarily achieve intended 
effects and may dysfunctionally distort what it claims to measure, creating unintended 
consequences. (Shore, 2008; Smith, 1995). Its success is therefore contested based on 
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differing underlying value models. Alternative models have proposed a greater focus on 
qualitative data and staff and patient narratives to inform broader understanding of practice. 
 
NPM: resilience or decline?  
 
There has been considerable debate about whether there is evidence of a post-NPM 
configuration. Various authors have argued that we are indeed observing a paradigm change 
and that this shift in managerial ideas and practices is overcoming NPM related weaknesses. 
Osborne (2006), for example, suggests that NPM may be a transitory stage in the evolution to 
New Public Governance (NPG) and Bryson and colleagues (2014) claim we are seeing the 
demise of NPM and rise of Public Value Governance. Christensen and Laegreid (2008) 
suggest there has been a reassertion of old public administration practices due to the failures 
of NPM. Dunleavy and colleagues (2006) have argued that in key ‘leading edge’ countries 
(the UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, The Netherlands and Japan), NPM has been 
‘largely stalled or reversed’ and that Digital Era Governance (DEG) is emerging as a new 
paradigm (Dunleavy et al., 2006, p. 467).  
Others are more sceptical in their assessment of NPM demise (Dawson & Dargie, 1999; 
Ferlie & Fitzgerald, 2002 ; Ferlie et al., 2011; Ferlie & Ongaro, 2015; Trenholm & Ferlie, 
2013). Focusing on the case of the organizational response to resurgent tuberculosis in the 
English NHS, they acknowledge some changes in emphasis in NPM doctrine, for example, 
more recent emphasis on management and less on markets (Ferlie & Fitzgerald, 2002). 
However, their case study suggests NPM remains resilient and embedded, despite its 
dysfunctionality in addressing complex, system level problems such as the one studied 
(Trenholm & Ferlie, 2013). Lodge and Gill (2011) found only limited evidence of a shift to 
post-NPM in New Zealand, another leading NPM jurisdiction. De Vries (2010) contends that 
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changes have been modest and the NPM paradigm is ‘in trouble, but is not really dead’ 
(p.91). De Vries and Nemec (2013) assert that some countries are still implementing NPM-
type reforms, including downsizing or introducing performance management but that other 
countries have chosen to implement alternative paradigms. Overall, therefore the academic 
debate continues as to whether NPM has been resilient or is in decline.  
 
Management of Medical Research in the NHS 
 
Internationally there has been increasing focus on creating ‘health research systems’ that 
integrate medical research and clinical care (World Health Organization, 2004) and the UK 
(along with Canada) is recognised as a pioneer in this field (Hanney & González Block, 
2006). Since the 1990’s Research & Development (R&D) has been a core activity in the NHS 
along with a focus on the management of funding for R&D (Feehally, 2002). These 
developments were consolidated in 2006 when the English Department of Health (DoH) 
established the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), one of whose tasks is to 
develop and support the infrastructures needed to embed a health research system in the NHS 
(Department of Health, 2006). 
The drive to systemically develop the UK’s capacity to undertake medical research has taken 
place in the context of a national push to strengthen the knowledge based economy. Health 
research has therefore been positioned as a driver of both health and wealth (Department of 
Health, 2006). Studies have suggested that economic value has become a key force shaping 
health research policy in the UK as well as elsewhere (Shaw & Greenhalgh, 2008; Stoneman, 
1999).  In particular, the life sciences industry has been seen as of great economic 
significance to the UK economy by successive governments and key economic central 
departments (Cooksey, 2006; Department of Business, 2011 ), an economic policy 
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strengthened by the financial crisis of 2008 which discredited the old UK model of a 
predominant banking and finance sector. Integral to policy underpinning the importance of 
health research is an emphasis on increasing the number of patients in trials (and their 
speedier recruitment) to accelerate the development of therapeutic products (Shaw and 
Greenhalgh, 2008). Indeed, Shaw and Greenhalgh’s analysis of UK health research policy 
concluded that research is reduced to numbers recruited into trials, with endorsement of 
particular practices based on a ‘high-turnover model’ where large numbers of patients are 
recruited to research (Shaw & Greenhalgh, 2008, p. 2516).   
As noted above, the NHS is an index case of NPM. Indeed, Greer and Jarman, (2007, p. 7) 
have described the Department of Health as ‘one of the purest products of the delivery-
oriented, business like ‘new public management’ that has been orthodoxy in the UK since the 
1980’s’.  In addition, Martin and colleagues (2017) have argued that the global recession of 
2008 strengthened a trend in the NHS, evident from 2005, away from increasing capacity to 
increasing productivity and that this new financial environment saw government seek to 
increase the influence of the market and corporate logics on the health system, including 
increased managerialism, performance management and competition. They suggest that areas 
of the health system previously immune to the influence of the market, from 2006 became 
subject to it. However, with the notable exception of Shaw and Greenhalgh’s (2008) work, 
discussed above, the NIHR, as a relatively recently instated component of the DoH, has not 
been subject to analysis of its organisational systems. 
Many of the ‘doctrinal components’ of NPM identified by Hood (1991) are evident in the 
NIHR’s foundational document, Best Research for Best Health (Department of Health, 2006). 
The need for professional management of the new health research system is articulated, and 
includes streamlined systems for knowledge management that will reduce bureaucracy and 
deliver efficiency (Goal 4 of the strategy). Performance management is proposed so that the 
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strategy will ‘operate under clear and robust management arrangements supported by 
programmes of evaluation’ (p.34) entailing explicit contractual arrangements, financial 
monitoring and control, clear lines of accountability and reviews of outputs and outcomes as 
well as value for money. It is also proposed that the goal to accelerate the initiation of 
research and increase its volume will be monitored and these research performance data made 
public. Goal 5 of the strategy focuses on value for money, identifying the ways in which the 
strategy will act ‘as sound custodians of public money’ (p.31). This will include setting up 
methods to evaluate the outcomes of funding investment. Competition is integral to the 
strategy. While the aim is to encourage research activity across all patients and professionals 
in England, and to use a population-based approach towards funding, it is also made clear 
that funding allocation will be competitive with awards made ‘to those organisations that are 
truly outstanding in international research terms’ (p.33). It is acknowledged that this will lead 
to ‘resources being allocated to a relatively small number of organisations whose location 
will be determined by excellence’ (p.33). These principles are evident and amplified in the 
NIHR’s own presentation of its structure and organisation (NIHR, 2017a, 2017d). The lines 
of management are made explicit with identified leaders, advisory boards and management 
systems organized ‘around products’ (Hood 1991). The principles of competitiveness, value 
for money and performance management are also articulated.  
The NIHR’s performance management structure is provided through its Clinical Research 
Network (CRN), made up of 15 Local Clinical Research Networks (LCRN) (NIHR, 2014a). 
The CRN provides funding additional to NIHR’s grant funding for studies. Grant funding is 
allocated on the basis of peer review but CRN funding, which provides infrastructural support 
for research, is allocated through a different process. Hospital Trusts in which research is 
conducted are required to monitor and report to LCRN the numbers of patients recruited to 
studies receiving LCRN infrastructural funding. These data  are published in annual national 
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league tables, which rank Trusts by the number of patients recruited in the previous year and 
the number of studies undertaken (NIHR, 2017c).  
In 2014/15, when the data for this research was collected, 73% of the NIHR’s £296 million to 
LCRN’s was allocated on the basis of ‘research activity’ i.e. the number of patients hospital 
trusts in that network recruited to research studies in the previous year (NIHR, 2014c). 
Across the NIHR, patients recruited to studies accrue a value weighted by the type of study 
they take part in (large trial, observational study or study that includes an intervention).  
Funds are then allocated back to hospital Trusts on the basis of weighted patient numbers 
plus the other (more minor) factors outlined below in Figure 1 (NIHR, 2017b). In this study 
site, the Trust then redistributes funds back to services according to their recruitment success. 
Since 2014/15 the NIHR LCRN model has further included a ‘performance based’ metric, 
with 1.2% of total funding allocated on the basis of the LCRN meeting the target of 80% of 
studies meeting the 70 day target to recruit a first patient to each study (NIHR, 2017e). The 
Trust we examined had not included this in its redistribution of funds back to directorates 
although there was an expectation that it may do so in future.  
 Figure 1 outlines the NIHR LCRN funding allocation for 2017/18. In this year, 78.2% of the 
£284.6 million was allocated based on ‘research activity’ (compared to 73% in 2014/15). 
‘Research activity’ remained principally focused on the number of patients recruited, but 
8.3% of this 78.2% was allocated based on the number of studies the LCRN led on (NIHR, 
2017b). In 2014/15 an additional £11.7 million was allocated as “Research Capacity 
Funding”, half of which was allocated evenly between LCRN and half allocated on the basis 
of the number of patients recruited. With this exception, the allocation categories are 
consistent between 2014/15, when this study was carried out, and the current 2017/18 model.  
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Figure 1: NIHR Local Clinical Research Network Infrastructural Funding Allocations 2017/18  
 
 
 
Therefore, the CRN provides a mechanism within NIHR to performance manage research at a 
national level using simple quantitative indicators, competitive league tables and financial 
incentives. To the best of our knowledge, no study has empirically investigated the 
implications of this regime for the debate surrounding the ‘death’ of NPM and the 
appropriateness of this regime for managing medical research. These questions are the focus 
of the current research study.  
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Methods 
 
Having set out the national functioning of the NIHR performance management system above, 
we undertook an in-depth investigation of its Trust-level functioning in a large inner-city 
Trust in England, comprising two teaching hospitals. The Trust is a high performer in the 
NIHR system, ranked in the national top ten Trusts for number of clinical studies and number 
of patients recruited to these studies (NIHR, 2014b). The purpose of the Trust-level study was 
to examine the potential consequences of the national NIHR performance system. As the first 
study in this area, it was exploratory in nature. The aim was not to study the prevalence of 
consequences and we make no claims in this regard.  
 
Four clinical services within this Trust were recruited to take part in the case study. Services 
are anonymised to protect identities but were purposively sampled to ensure we included a 
range of specialities and research types. We further sought to include a wide range of staff in 
these services. This included, clinical staff (both doctors and nurses) without a specific 
research remit, referred to here as ‘clinically-focused’ staff; secondly, doctors actively 
carrying out research, referred to here as ‘research-focused’ doctors; thirdly, research nurses, 
coordinators and managers, whose remit is research.  Finally, because of their influence in 
allocating resources, we sought to include service-level managers. Sampling reached 
theoretical saturation within our four case study services. It is nonetheless possible that an 
expansion of the number of case study services may have led to the development of further 
themes. This was not possible within the budgetary confines of this study.  
 
Focus groups were adopted for both pragmatic and epistemological reasons. Pragmatically, 
focus groups are less resource intensive than individual interviews. Epistemologically, we 
were interested in the dynamics between members of the groups, assuming that meaning can 
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be created through interactions in groups. We were further interested in potential 
disagreements between members of groups and sought to observe professionals challenge 
each other in this respect. While providing these advantages, it is important to note potential 
weaknesses of the focus group method: groups may stifle individual voices and can be 
difficult to recruit to (Bryman, 2008).  
 
With the aim of creating a dynamic where individuals would feel more comfortable 
contributing to discussion, where possible focus groups were organised to comprise individuals 
doing the same job e.g. clinical nurses were separated from research nurses. Outside of this 
division, separating professionals proved difficult in practice as busy participants tended to turn 
up to whichever group they could attend. In Service A and C clinically focused doctors were 
in the same focus group as research-focused doctors and in all groups, those in management 
roles were placed in groups with research-focused staff for the pragmatic reason that doing so 
made it possible to include a wider variety of professionals. Participants were recruited through 
Research & Development Leads in each service who were asked to email staff the participant 
information leaflet and consent form as well as an invitation to participate in the research. 
Participants were provided with a light lunch to incentivise participation.  
The study’s original research questions were: a) what barriers and enablers do staff face in 
recruiting patients to research? b) How do staff experience and perceive the CRN system? The 
study’s original focus was pragmatic and centred on an organisational desire to understand and 
address barriers to patient recruitment. The current paper’s focus was arrived at through 
theoretical induction. Our analysis moved from the initial broad, pragmatic focus of the study 
through to the specific theoretical issues established in the literature as it became apparent that 
our data was an interesting case study of the theoretical debate surrounding NPM resilience 
and decline. This paper therefore focuses on the following question:  Do staff experiences and 
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perceptions indicate any unintended or unwanted consequences due to the NIHR LCRN 
performance management system? In addition, in this paper we discuss whether the NIHR 
LCRN performance management system constitutes an example of NPM resilience or decline.  
The data were collected between February and June 2015. The focus groups and interviews 
were audio-recorded and transcribed in full. The data were managed using Nvivo 10 software 
and analysed thematically. We drew on Spencer and colleagues’ ‘analytic hierarchy’, moving 
iteratively from descriptive coding through to themes, concepts and the application of NPM 
theory (Spencer, Ritchie, & O'Connor, 2003, pp. 213-215).  By this means we moved 
inductively from coding of the broad themes to specific theoretical constructs. In keeping with 
the strategies proposed by Mays and Pope (2000), both positive and negative cases of 
theoretical constructs were coded and incorporated into the analysis. The first author coded the 
data and undertook the analysis while discussing data, findings and emerging theoretical 
constructs with the other authors. This provided opportunities for analytic challenge and 
development.   
The Trust’s R&D Department approved the study and confirmed that ethical review was not 
required. Written informed consent was sought from all participants. Participants have been 
anonymised in this report. All participants were emailed the transcript of their 
interview/focus groups and offered the opportunity to amend anything they had said. Four 
participants made minor edits. 
In total, 56 staff took part in ten focus groups and three one-to-one interviews. The interviews 
were undertaken when, unexpectedly, only one person turned up to two focus groups and when 
a key individual was unable to attend a focus group. Participant details are provided in Table 
1. Focus groups averaged 51 minutes, while interviews averaged 27 minutes. 
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TABLE 1: Participants by Service and Role 
 Service A  Service B  Service C  Service D  Total  
Research Nurses* (RN) 3 3 6 6 18 
Research-focused 
doctors** (RD) 
2 5 5 7 19 
Clinically-focused 
Nurses*** (CN) 
3 0 1 6 10 
Clinically-focused 
Doctors**** (CD) 
1 0 5 0 6 
Department 
Managers***** (SM) 
3 0 0 0 3 
Total  12 8 17 19 56 
* Includes research coordinators, one research assistant and one research manager  
**Includes doctors with academic posts and those with some allocated research time. Includes 
research fellows.  
*** Includes one Allied Health Professional  
**** Doctors with no allocated research time 
*****Service manager, general manager and admissions manager 
 
Some of our Trust case study services had more participants or a better spread of roles than 
others. It was particularly difficult to recruit clinical staff to the study and we were unable to 
recruit any clinical nurses in Department B and only recruited one nurse in Department C. 
Similarly, it was difficult to recruit service-level managers.  This may have been because it 
was more difficult to convince clinically-focused and management staff that this research was 
relevant to them. 
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Results  
 
Our key findings relate to audit-style management and measurement; the flexibilisation of 
research nurse staff; and staff reports of potential unintended consequences of these practices, 
including measure fixation, staff recruitment and retention difficulties and gaming.  
 
Audit-style management & measurement  
 
Our findings echo the literature suggesting a liability in NPM-style management for concept 
reduction and deficits in understanding broader practice (Van Dooren et al., 2015). In this 
domain of health research, we found strong performance management and measurement but 
of a limited range of activities.  As Lewis (2016) observes, the performance focus in NPM 
can create a paradoxical excess of performance frameworks coupled with a management 
deficit, evidenced in high profile cases where health services achieving high performance on 
indicators have subsequently been shown to be providing sub-standard care.  
Participants in all services reported that LCRN funding was vital to their ability to do 
research because, although grant funding makes up the bulk of funding for studies. Such 
funds to support infrastructure were known to be allocated based on previous success in 
numbers of patients recruited as well as type of study they were recruited to.  Thus 
recruitment success translated into the allocation of funding from the NIHR to LCRN (as 
described above), but also, in turn, from this LCRN to the Trust and then from the Trust to 
the individual hospital services.  This funding flow is visualised below in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Funding flow in case study LCRN & Trust  
 
 
 
Participants reported that the primary focus on the number of patients recruited to studies was 
creating pressure to devalue factors not measured, and that this could pose an increased risk 
to patient experience and safety. This concern was explicitly raised by some research nurses:  
I mean I think there’s a real problem in [the recruitment indicator] – essentially 
that’s one of the only metrics that’s recognised by NIHR.  So there’s no measure of 
quality, there’s no measure of safety in any of these processes.  And so I think, you 
know, if you were actually looking at patient-reported experience during a study, I 
mean I think that would be a really interesting thing to look at, because I think in 
some studies you may have absolutely fantastic recruitment rates, but those patients 
may have actually had a very poor experience of taking part in research.  And they 
may never want to take part in a research study again.  They may tell their friends 
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and family that they had a terrible experience.  And so overall, I think, you have a 
negative outcome.   But I think that that’s a real shortfall in terms of NIHR. 
RN1, Service D 
Clinical nurses in this service also articulated concern about what they perceived as 
inappropriate levels of pressure on patients to take part in research and the potential for 
practice to veer towards the edge of safety where clinical issues that emerged during research 
visits were not dealt with. While this also highlights issues of communication between 
clinical and research staff, the clinical nurses explicitly suggested that this behaviour could, at 
least in part, be explained by the pressure on their research colleagues to recruit: 
 I get the impression that they’re under a lot of pressure to recruit patients to the 
studies.  And therefore they’re being driven from behind, by the doctors who are doing 
research, that they feel a pressure to get the patients into the studies.  And if the 
patients aren’t recruited, the doctors want to know why, because they are looking for 
certain numbers.  So I do realise it’s not easy for them either. 
          CN1, Service D 
Research nurses in Service C also reported that they experienced pressure to recruit patients 
to research and felt that appropriate recruitment was being devalued by the Trust owing to the 
financial incentives attached to patient recruitment nationally: 
The pressure is still there to recruit quickly and not necessarily in the appropriate 
manner […]. For [the Trust] it’s still very much, it’s numbers, it’s not a patient, it’s a 
number, it’s money that they’re going to get. 
RN3, Service C 
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These accounts suggest that the local management culture was, in keeping with NPM 
doctrine, performance-driven and target-led. In all services, there was frustration that, as staff 
perceived it, the focus was increasingly on performance managing research staff rather than 
on identifying and addressing barriers to undertaking research. For example:  
 
RD3: There’s enough pressure to get patients to studies, to deliver the scientific target 
objective, without also sort of people in clinic then worrying about the fact that they 
haven’t recruited a patient that day, they’ve only got fifteen days left to recruit. I don’t 
think it’s totally helpful. 
RD1: If [target] helps to speed up the R&D process, which is very protracted and, you 
know. I mean all the paperwork that we are overburdened with as part of research is 
a major obstacle.  And puts probably ninety-five percent of people off from doing 
research in the first place.  So if the targets help to speed the paperwork process up 
and makes people think in R&D how to facilitate the process better, then that’s great.  
But if it has a detrimental effect on people who are actually doing the research at the 
coalface, then obviously that’s not good.  
Service B 
As alluded to in the first quote above, the national NIHR system does not routinely measure 
research participant safety or experience. Patient experience is measured in clinical services 
but the NHS’s ‘Friends and Family Test’ (FFT), which seeks patient feedback, does not 
include patients’ experiences of research. Neither is it possible in this survey to identify 
which patients are taking part in research.  The NHS requires staff to report ‘Adverse Events’ 
and breaches of Good Clinical Practice (GCP) (including through mandatory externally 
24 
 
chaired monitoring committees for interventional studies) but none of the concerns or 
incidents reported in this study reached this threshold. Therefore, the system has limited 
capacity to learn (Senge et al., 1994) through the activities performance managed. As 
discussed above, NPM-style systems have been criticised for the barriers they present to 
learning (Van Dooren et al., 2015). A key public inquiry in England into sub-standard 
hospital care was critical of over-reliance on quantitative indicators and recommended that to 
prevent future similar tragedies hospital needed to take greater heed of the insights of staff, 
patients and carers by paying greater attention to narratives (Francis, 2013). Further,  research 
with senior healthcare leaders in the NHS has found widespread agreement concerning the 
limitations of formal metrics for monitoring quality and safety and the importance of 
incorporating ‘soft intelligence’ (Martin et al., 2015). Yet the focus here, in the context of 
health research, formally at least, remains on simple quantitative indicators.  
 
There was also widespread frustration amongst participants that the simple performance 
indicator did not reflect the variety of study types. They reported that the NIHR’s 
‘complexity weighting’ (which gives more weight to interventional compared to 
observational studies) was insufficient to account for the duration of follow up in studies, the 
level of intervention (for example, taking a routine blood sample compared to inserting a 
medical device) nor the number of eligible patients. Participants reported that high or low 
levels of recruitment in one year, owing to the type of study, rather than staff efforts at 
recruitment, could lead to an upward or downward spiral of resources. For example: 
RD1: I think it’s ridiculous, you know, just because we haven’t recruited in one year, 
for the next year you’re going to lose research staff so of course next year you’re going 
to have less recruitment. 
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 […] 
 RN1: Two years ago we had an incredibly quick recruiting one that basically it 
didn’t need much criteria, you could go to clinic and you could recruit and we 
recruited hundreds.  We haven’t got that study any more, it stopped, it went into 
follow-up. CRN think that therefore we’re not doing anything because we’re not 
recruiting. Obviously those hundred patients are still in follow-up, we’re still 
managing those patients.  Research doesn’t stop when you stop recruiting.  And, for 
me, that’s, they don’t understand that at all.  And if they do understand it, they don’t 
care – it’s all about recruitment and not about the whole thing.   
       
           Service A   
 
This issue is echoed in a recent Cancer Research UK study (Brown et al, 2015), which argued 
that the system is favouring specialisms that are naturally better placed to recruit high 
numbers of patients due to high numbers of studies with large eligible populations and short 
follow-up times with patients. Further research is required to investigate this claim but our 
study adds weight to CRUK’s concerns. Certainly, this approach is in keeping with the 
competition components of NPM, which include ‘reward and sanctions’ in the form of 
published performance (reputational effects) and the award of bonuses dependent on 
performance (Bevan & Hood, 2006). It further ascribes to the NPM ‘best to best’ budgetary 
allocation principle for measured performance (Bevan & Hood, 2006, p. 519). Such 
principles are not without controversy. For example, the ‘best to best’ principle can be 
challenged by the rival principles of ‘equal shares’ or ‘best to worst’ (giving the most to the 
weakest or most disadvantaged units) (Bevan & Hood, 2006).  
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Flexibilization of research nurse workforce  
NPM is characterised by greater flexibility in hiring staff (Hood, 1991). The findings suggest 
flexibilization of the research nurse workforce, in keeping with NPM doctrine (Hood, 1991). 
Participants reported that research nurse posts funded by LCRN were short-term contracts in 
which nurses could be redeployed between services and hospitals in the Trust based on the 
recruitment success of services in the previous year. Participants in all services reported 
problems recruiting research nurses, particularly those with clinical experience relevant to the 
specialism. Service B for example, was, at the time of this study, on the fourth round of 
advertising a research nurse position. Participants suggested that research nurse posts were 
less attractive to ‘quality’ candidates in part because research nurses were liable to be re-
deployed annually.  
In addition, participants in service D reported that the narrowing of the role of research nurses 
due to the adoption of crude performance indicators was affecting the retention of research 
nurses. In this service, research nurses reported that morale and retention was down because 
they felt more like ‘agents’ than nurses as their role had become so focused on recruitment.  
 
Gaming 
Previous research has identified ‘gaming’, the deliberate manipulation of behaviour to secure 
strategic advantage (Smith, 1995), as an unwanted consequence of the performance 
measurement and management regime typical of NPM (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Greener, 
2005). It has been argued that performance management can distort the priorities and 
practices of those delivering services, paradoxically, producing worse outcomes for the 
intended beneficiaries (Lowe, 2013). Various gaming strategies have been identified in health 
care and other public services. One strategy involves ‘output distortion’ (Hood, 2006, p. 516), 
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in which an organisation may experience ‘measure fixation’, pursing success as measured 
rather than as intended (Smith, 1995).  
In our study, some staff explicitly reported that the system was encouraging gaming, 
including ‘output distortion’ (Hood, 2006) and ‘measure fixation’ (Van Dooren et al., 2015). 
It was asserted that the Trust was prioritizing studies that would accrue large numbers of 
patients, attracting high levels of funding, rather than prioritising on the basis of scientific 
output or patient benefit. Further it was reported that observational studies of little or no 
scientific benefit were being undertaken for the purpose of increasing patient recruitment, 
with no use made of the data: 
The biggest problem with it is that, you know, if you’re doing a revolutionary study 
that’s kind of changed the world, you might only have ten patients in it.  You know [a 
specialism specific study] the holy grail of [specialism], and I published in New 
England Journal of Medicine with ten patients in it, that would change the world of 
[specialism].  I’m nowhere near doing that by the way. And that study, you know, would 
have low priority at the moment because there would only be ten patients […] So there’s 
a lot of gaming that goes on.  I mean doctors are very, very good at gaming.  They work 
out, “Okay what do I need to do to score high?”  And then they do it.   
RD4, Service D 
Below a research nurse and research doctors discuss their concerns in relation to the NIHR 70 
day target to recruit the first patient, suggesting that in their experience this target is being 
gamed and potentially has a detrimental impact on research: 
RN1  I think, having set up studies for the national studies, I felt we’ve seen that these R&D 
targets really stop – well, they don’t always, you know, promote research. So one 
centre, we know, won't even fill out all the R&D [forms] and get signed up until they 
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have a patient […] Therefore they’re not recruiting patients.  And that’s really, feels 
like something that R&D have put in place to promote research and actually it’s just 
stopping it. 
RD1: I agree.  I think the [seventy day] target is actually a barrier to research. 
RD2: Absolutely. 
RD1: People want to do research, that’s why they’re taking on the study.  But they don’t need 
the added pressure of, “I need to recruit a patient or I’m going to be penalised.”  You 
know, if the patients aren’t there, the patients aren’t there. If you can’t find the patient, 
why should you be penalised?  You can’t force patients and recruit inappropriate 
patients into studies because of the fear of not meeting a target. 
 
 Service A 
 
Gaming of this kind, ‘output distortion’, has previously been reported in the NHS where, for 
example, treatments or training commenced but were not completed in situations in which the 
performance management indicator only measured commencement (Hood, 2006, p. 518). Its 
presence indicates, not only the persistence of NPM style management practices but the 
potential continuation of unwanted effects in a sector exemplifying the late-adoption of these 
management practices.  
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
 
The question of NPM resilience or decline is important because NPM-style performance 
management has been shown to have a liability for unintended and dysfunctional effects. The 
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UK health sector has long been seen as a high impact sector for NPM (Ferlie et al., 1996). 
Meanwhile, the R&D domain of the NHS has been growing in importance for about twenty 
years (Feehally, 2002), a development reinforced by the establishment of the NIHR. 
Therefore our study investigates an important theoretical debate in an under-studied, 
relatively new empirical context. While we acknowledge that this is a small scale study, it is 
one of the few to investigate NIHR as an organisation and consider the managerial practices 
that populate this important new domain (see also Shaw & Greenhalgh, 2008). Our findings 
begin to fill this gap in the literature.  
Our analysis of NIHR structures and policy documents combined with the case study of a 
high-performing NHS Trust contributes to the theoretical NPM literature by suggesting that 
the case of medical research in England’s NHS contradicts claims of the demise of NPM. On 
the contrary, it provides an example of the recent adoption of NPM as an important 
component of the managerial system in the large and important health research sector, since 
the establishment of the NIHR in 2006.  
Our findings are in keeping with wider research evidencing the resilience of NPM (De Vries 
& Nemec, 2013; Ferlie & Ongaro, 2015; Lodge & Gill, 2011; Trenholm & Ferlie, 2013). In 
terms of NPM’s competition components, the publication by NIHR of national league tables 
of patient recruitment by Trusts is in keeping with Dunleavy and colleagues’ (2006) assertion 
that league tables are still spreading and is the main legacy of NPM. Both Dunleavy and 
colleagues (2006) and Osborne (2009) assert that there is evidence of improved performance 
measurement, including a move to service processes and outcomes from NPM’s focus on 
service inputs and outputs (Osborne, 2009). However, the NIHR performance management 
system shows a clear national focus on the output of patient recruitment. Performance 
management remains in the traditional ‘audit’ style (Power, 1997), encapsulating a 
reductionist, quantitative approach. Despite the knowledge base, the national regime suffers 
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the usual bias towards selecting measurable, available indicators resulting in concept 
reduction and the risk of reconfirming or reinforcing preconceived standpoints, rather than 
providing an account of performance (Van Dooren et al., 2015).  
Both Osborne (2009) and Bryson (2014) claim there has been a change in the value base from 
the efficacy of competition and the market-place in NPM to neo-corporatism in New Public 
Governance (Osborne, 2009) and democratic theory in Public Value Governance (Bryson et 
al., 2014). Yet the NIHR system illustrates that management of medical research at the 
national level has retained a focus on competition in a market-style environment, with 
monetary value attached to patients recruited and competition amongst LCRN for finite 
funding.  The prevailing view of rationality in the NIHR performance system is ‘economic 
man’, self-interested decision makers incentivised through pay-by-performance, rather than 
the belief in public spiritedness beyond narrow self-interest.  Overall then, the case of 
medical research in the English NHS would seem to empirically contradict claims of the 
demise of NPM.  
As discussed, the NIHR’s intent is to contribute research that will benefit patients and 
society, leading to improved outcomes in terms of health and wealth. While NIHR is keen to 
find evidence of impact, it acknowledges the challenges of demonstrating impact in the 
complex environment of health research (NIHR, 2018). Our study does not seek to contribute 
to the question of the impact of NIHR LCRN funding in terms of health and wealth outcomes 
and we make no claims in this regard. However, our examination of the LCRN NIHR system 
in a high-performing NHS Trust suggests that, in keeping with the NPM literature (Bevan & 
Hood, 2006; Hood & Peters, 2004, p. 269; Mannion & Braithwaite, 2012; Senge et al., 1994; 
Smith, 1995),  this performance management system may produce unwanted and 
dysfunctional consequences. Research nurses and clinical nurses’ perception that the system 
was encouraging, and indeed pressuring research staff, to narrowly focus on recruitment at 
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the expense of broader organisational objectives, can be categorised as a concern that the 
system is encouraging ‘measure fixation’ (Smith, 1995). The assertion of some doctors that 
‘gaming’ was taking place to increase the financial gains to the Trust from recruitment while 
contributing little to meaningful research outcomes is also in keeping with previous research 
on NPM (Hood, 2006). These staff concerns regarding the reduction of the rather intangible 
asset of medical knowledge creation into simple, recruitment-focused indicators, reflect the 
concern that NPM models may encourage organisations to “[hit] the target and miss the 
point” (Bevan & Hood, 2006, p. 521). In this empirical context, managers may focus on the 
number of patients recruited and miss factors not counted, including patient retention in 
studies, patient experience and safety and staff morale and retention. These findings 
contribute to the literature evidencing  unintended consequences of NPM performance 
management systems (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Hood & Peters, 2004, p. 269; Mannion & 
Braithwaite, 2012; Senge et al., 1994; Smith, 1995) and highlight a need for further 
investigation in order to explore the potential disconnect between system information (what 
we believe we know) and practice (what is experienced).  
The political realities of this entrenched NPM institutional landscape, demand public sector 
accountability, defined in terms of demonstrating one’s performance (Lewis, 2016). 
Specifically, the accountability regime of NPM logic mandates that the link between medical 
research inputs (public money) and outcomes (health and wealth) be demonstrated. 
Performance data for the latter are difficult, if not impossible to reasonably demonstrate, and 
outputs (e.g. patient recruitment) therefore become a more realistic goal for performance 
measurement. Yet in this process of making accountability and measurement possible the 
very concept of interest is reduced and understanding of practice obscured.  In this sense 
performance regimes in NPM may serve the purpose of making organisations accountable, 
but not necessarily for what matters. 
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Proponents of NPM might argue that use of alternative output oriented measures (e.g. 
research publications rather than patient recruitment), could address the problems of 
measurement and management we have highlighted. Yet our study highlights that these 
would likely be insufficient to identify unintended and unanticipated consequences. The 
concerns raised by staff in this research study highlight the importance of ‘soft intelligence’ 
(Bevan & Hood, 2006; Mannion & Braithwaite, 2012) and the need to understand how the 
system is performing beyond pre-defined indicators.  
A detailed discussion of potential alternatives to NPM management of health research is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, some of the broader Network Governance (NG) 
ideas explored earlier provide a basis for further thought about what a non-NPM model of 
health research management might look like. These ideas would stress the need for active 
patient participation in the research process, including in the early stages of study design and 
within the spirit of co-production. There would likely be active and regular consultation with 
patient orientated third sector organizations at study and also at a wider research policy level. 
The views and experiences of more junior staff (e.g. research nurses) would also be seen as 
important to capture through such techniques as focus groups and quality circles. It is worth 
noting that, given that clinically-focused doctors and nurses (as well as research-focused staff 
themselves) had concerns about research practice, our study suggests the need to seek data 
about the research process, not just from research-focused staff, but also from clinically-
focused staff who work alongside researchers. In an alternative model to NPM the quality of 
the experience of the research process by patients and staff would be seen as important as 
well as hitting quantitative recruitment targets. There would also likely be an active process 
of organizational learning, with debriefs at the end of research cycles to derive ideas for 
continuous improvement in future research management. 
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A further intriguing question is ‘why?’ this NPM embeddedness was found in the NIHR 
which is a relatively recently created agency. Future work should look further at its 
governance, strategy, operations and culture. It is an agency under the clear direction (indeed 
integrated within) of the DoH and with clear targets to meet. DoH has previously been seen 
as a pro NPM outlier within Whitehall (Greer & Jarman, 2007).  
Overall, this article raises concerns regarding the management of medical research in the 
English health research system. It contributes to the body of research suggesting that NPM is 
far from dead but rather resilient (De Vries & Nemec, 2013; Ferlie & Ongaro, 2015; Lodge & 
Gill, 2011) and continues to be adopted in a key UK public service. Our research also 
contributes to the large body of evidence raising concerns about the potential for unintended 
and dysfunctional consequences. Given the resilience of NPM in the face of the large body of 
critical literature, we might question the extent to which academic debate and evidence is 
having an impact on public managers and policy makers and alternative models are perceived 
as viable alternatives.  
This research has some limitations that should be noted. Our study is of the national NIHR 
system for performance managing research and our findings demonstrate that this system 
conforms to key tenets of NPM, evidencing NPM resilience in a core service in the UK. We 
examined potential consequences of this system by focusing in-depth on one high performing 
NHS Hospital Trust. In terms of the unintended consequences highlighted by the Trust-level 
study, we make no claims regarding population-level generalisabilty. Rather our study 
highlights the potential for these unintended consequences to occur. Further research is 
required to establish prevalence of these consequences. Research is also required to 
understand from the perspective of policy makers and mangers why they continue to adopt 
NPM and how they understand and apply the evidence on it. Further, we did not empirically 
investigate the functioning of NIHR-LCRN in 2006 and so do not claim to provide an in-
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depth illustration of its functioning at this time point. Nonetheless, the foundational 
documents we have cited in this paper suggest that many of the characteristics of NPM were 
evident its institutional set up at this time and suggest consistency between 2006 and today.  
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